tv Book Discussion on The Taliban Revival CSPAN August 12, 2014 12:23am-1:56am EDT
leadership is pragmatic. they're billionaires squabbling for power. when they involved in a blood where war with iraq they sent other people out the leadership of tehran didn't show up on the battlefield. israeli security folks i talked to think that in fact it's irrational to the leadership. what they believe would be hard for the israeli prime minister not to act if they actually possession nuclear weapons. the good news for israel is they have 200 nuclear weapons. the question is does iran want to be wiped off the map. and i hasn't seen anything to suggest that, but there's lots of reasons to not want that leadership to have it. the frightening thing is there's already an islamist bomb in pakistan. >> can i add to that? >> sure. >> the real problem -- there's the problem what they can do under a -- with a nuclear threat that is credible, which gives them a great deal of freedom,
which is one of the reasons that if they actually get it, you can expect the saudis to have one, we now have the saudis so scared they're cooperating with israel. because they don't want these other lunatics to be armed in ways they aren't, because while they dislike us, we're down the road enemy. we're an enemy right now because we're there. but they've got plenty of other muslims to kill before they get around to us. >> yes, sir, right here. [inaudible question] [inaudible question] >> the question is what it does. the ottoman empire was a decrepit, incompetent, utterly
useless creature. the tragedy of world war i is all of the old empire that got destroyed relatively liberal ones. out of the russian empire you get the soviet union and joseph stall yip. out of germ now any you get nazi system e germany and adolph history holiday, italy, moussaoui lean -- muse lean any. i would say world war i is a catastrophe. world war ii came out of world war i as the unfinish yesterday business. -d. >> but you might not have had world war ii but for world war i, and i don't think there can be any question that the u.s. involvement in world war i and the fact that the u.s. first of all actually did end the war
because we put the force in there some then got the armistice on the basis of crazy promises from woodrow wilson that the germans and the middle east and everyone else accepted, and the result was nation states that aren't nations, the result was germany that was so upset at the unfairness of the way it ended we got naziism. we got all of these things as a result of that war, which was the single foreign policy mistake of the united states in its entire history because of the cop sequences from that point on. it was that war that made the 20th century the bloodiest century in the history of mankind, and that was in large part a result of the well-intentioned, fumbling progressive president and his allies who went in and mucked up everything in a way that we have yet to be able to overcome. >> world war ii, 2.5% of the entire world died. we forget how bad it was.
>> if i can talk about what doug -- response to this specific question. if world war i had not taken place and the caliphate exist evidence it was restricted to where it was, because the world -- there were in fact boundaries, and whether it was the ottoman empire or what they ever boundaries were asset and accepted and they no through was a problem if they withinaround. that's very difference different from now. if the muslim world grew as site have without the anointing the around families by us and the british and french market have been a different future. we can't go back. >> want to get one or two more questions, and we libber tate tareans believe in a rule of -- the rule of clock here, to stay on time. yes, ma'am.
[inaudible question] >> i want a quick question. we don't have time for the statement. [inaudible question] >> there's no question. we have defensive -- a treaty alliance with japan. we would back japan. no question. >> herman? we got the question. herman? >> well, there's a treaty alliance and we have made known to the leadership in beijing we would stand behind japan and also urged japan not to push the issue. >> okay. another question. the gentleman right down here in front.
[inaudible question] >> okay, okay, we got it. how long can the u.s. and europe continue to ignore militant islam? herman? >> well, i think we have ignored it too long already. it's one of the big mistakes we make is assuming it's a single block. there are 100,600,000,000 people in the muslim world. half of it in four countries, bangladesh, india, indonesia and pakistan, and life for muslims is very different in each country. even in the arab world, day-to-day life is so different than saudi arabia can but nor fundamentalists there isn't so
much difference, and even if you assume there's one percent that has very stringent interpretation of islam, that's 16 million people, whole country, and not being engaged in the ideological and theological war with them, not dealing with elements that are reconcilablable within the islamic world is a tragedy that it is going to come to bite us and may not be, as doug said, an existential threat, but it's a threat where you can see casualties in hundreds of thousands through terrorist activity and something we have to worry about a great5wut5wqñ >> okay. we're out of time. but i've got a final question for the panelists that you can answer in one word. if we have one of these crisis, blowups that the three of you
have outlined is possible, do you think the obama state department and defense department is up to the task? >> in unison now. one two, three, no. >> ladies and gentlemen, on that note, thank you all for coming. next year i'll see if doug -- if mark will allow us to have two hours, because -- >> don't forget to subscribe to the "washington times." >> there, you have the instruction, subscribe to the "washington times" and you have to support the american foreign policy council the cato institute to keep all of us alive. >> and employed. >> to help you stay alive. thank you. >> all this week on c-span2, featuring booktv in primetime.
coming up on tuesday, books on the law and legal issues. at 8:00 p.m., sidney paul on licensed to lie. exposing corruption in the department of justice. at 95:00. mike away and david fisher on u.s. marshals, inside america's most storied law. agency. then followed by lawrence tribe discussing uncertain justice, the roberts court and the constitution. booktv in primetime all this week on c-span2. >> on the next washington journal, we have bob cusack, and joined by charl schmidt to discuss federal funding to come bate the disease and his groups advocating for this living with h.i.v. a.i.d.s. washington journal is live on c-span every day at 7:00 a.m. eastern.
>> here's some of the high >> saturday, at 6'm eastern on the civil war. the depiction of slavery in movies, and sunday, on real america, at 4:00 p.m., an interview with president herbert hoover, and let us know what you think about the programs you're watching. call us or e-mail us. join the c-span conversation.
like us on facebook, follow us on twitter. >> now a look at the return of the taliban afghanistan. hassan abbas talks about "the taliban revival. violence and extremism on the pakistan-afghan frontier." this is 90 minutes. >> good morning, ladies and gentlemen and gentlemen, and welcome to this session on the resurgence of the taliban. we are happy to welcome you this
morning, and i must tell you from the very beginning that this event is cosponsored with another organization and -- so, what this session is about is the launch offering this book "the taliban revival: violence and extremism on the pakistan-afghanistan frontier." this is indeed timely book. or maybe not so much a timely book. i don't know. because we arrive at the end of the cycle. this cycle is a cycle of intervention in afghanistan. definitely not the end of the afghan conflict. we can hope it will be the end of the conflict but unless we believe our own propaganda, this is not likely to be so in the months to come. since the end of 2001, i mean, a lot of people have died in afghanistan. both west and afghan and people from the reason. all that was made to eradicate
the taliban, and where are we standing today? i mean, i know that the focus these days in the country is mostly about the election and what is going wrong in this election. but that what we see actually is a resurgence of the taliban in the south and east where none of us can be really surprised seeing they were massive formation in both places. so the opinion is not whether this is the case. we know what is going on, or try to know what is going on we certainly don't know everything. the question is whether that this means that almost 13 years of war in afghanistan, of additional war in afghanistan, has served no purpose. i mean, as the taliban been eradicated? definitely not. does it mean the western intervention was usesless?
perhaps not. dot it mean it was a success? definitely a different story. and this is what this book in many ways is about. how did we get to the situation that we are in now? how did we get to a situation that the movement of everybody in 2002 saw as being more or less eradicated, or what was left of it was essentially residual. how is it that this movement has come up again and so on? and this is what the book is about, and i am happy to say that this attempt to bring an objective perspective on the way things move, look at different angle, and this is a dimensional aspect of the book which makes its interest. so, it will -- this is something that is being very discussed about. the role of western policies. again, this is something we should slightly discuss. today we tend to say, we'll live
with a sense of mission accomplished, or so we would like to believe. the role of military in decisionmaking and son and so -- so on and so forth. so for that matter we are delighted today to welcome the author, hassan abad. he is professor and chair of the department of regional and analytical studies of the national college of international security affairs in washington, dc. also senior adviser at the aegis society, and served as a distinguished professor at columbia university and a senior adviser at the center for signs and international affairs at the canadian school of government at harvard university. to me what is more important is very perfect writer and many of you remember his first book,
"pakistan's race into." so with those words i'll not stand between you and the speaker and ask him please to come up and present your work. >> thank you very much. >> thank you very much. it's a great privilege and honor to be here and to see many friends and for so many of us to be able to find time. in the beginning i also mention i am thankful to carnegie and fred rick, an old friend and his work has been guiding many of us. his courageous writings were a source of inspiration for studies, i'm also thankful to the organization in this. this is a newer organization, a think tank, advocacy group, and the one group and one different thing about this organization is
primarily americans but the benefiting from the guidance of many of the scholars, and they are -- they believe in making pakistan a progressive state and also building the u.s.-pakistan relations. so thank you very much. and i wish you best of luck in your endeavors. my plan to take 30 to 40 minutes, to first give you a gist of the main arguments of my book, if i may call that. and also briefly talk about my recent visit, which was kind of a book tour. i landed in pakistan for about 15 days, but also had an opportunity to go to iraq two day after mosul wases taken over. hat the opportunity to speak in
iraq to the law enforcement agency. and some of the things i heard and i have -- i'm just mentioning.iraq the linkage between the pakistan taliban and the new militant terrorist group claims to have built a new state. it's very interesting. some of the slogans on the streets in iraq are in our language. i talk about the linkages as well. first and foremost, i must add, -- my ground, other handmy academic area, a great honor and privilege to have served as a police chief, a police officer in pakistan's tribal area, between 1995 and 1997, and some of my idea, my thoughts, are
based upon that, and one of the understandings with my publisher was that great my helped me in conceiving the idea. they wanted to be an academic book and also have some of the stories, some of the ideas from the -- so i have anecdotes from that region as well. what i want to begin with i have traveled around the world, lived in many major cities about my experience for having been with the pashtuns, who for both the pakistani taliban make up to 50, 60, 80% of all taliban mitchell experience living among pashtun -- i'm not pashtun -- i have not seen any other group which is as hospitable and as friendly as pashtun. at the same time, i found among the pashtuns, that they are very
-- principle is very religious but in day-to-day affairs they are not only very pragmatic but secular, and i observed as a assistant of police in 1997-1998. it was taken over by the militants who were beheading and killing people on the streets before we had become -- and i remember knew years before all this begun if you really want in pakistan in those days -- i'm not -- mid-1990s but if you want to have good music, sit beside the stream, have a drink perhaps as well, or whatever you smoke, if you want to do that, the way it changed and radicalized, the phenomenon, and this brings me to the pashtun. having seen them as hospitable
and very secular, and i can only one name, who was going with gandhi. any pashtun leader or pakistani leader was so close to gandhi, the great indian leader, that people were going in front of gandhi, used to call him frontier gandhi because of his secular ideas, despite being a religious map. the biggest enigma was having seen this up close, what radicalized to the extent they produce -- they are producing unfortunately 70 to 80% of all taliban. what had gone wrong? that was in search of that question was that i started woring on my book. the second element was, in united states and the western world, we are now very familiar with the phrase -- if you stop
thinking of the history books you find most history, or even in the political arena, focusing on south asia if there's a comparative political study, mostly on pakistan, and india, of course, and sri lanka. you might fine it very difficult to find a book which is comparing pakistani and -- this is the kind of post-9/11 construct because of the security reasons, political reasons, because of the terrible -- the focus was on these two countries, but not enough academic study or historical treatment of the subject so that -- i realized if if i want to tell more about pashtun, pashtuns and that's how i'm constantly pronouncing it differently because in pakistan we call it pashtun, and the
iran -- their side is called pashtun. so that is -- to do -- pakistan is -- built in 1700s. very different ideas and different ethnic factors and tribalism played a major role in the creation of what we know today as afghanistan. in pakistan, it was of course a very secular and progressive movement, and students and staff write being the most political pakistani leaders. be amazed. they were from all very different ethnic backgrounds, different sectarian backgrounds, all very secular. it would seem if you look at
those files from 1940, it will be difficult for you to comprehend how a state, whose founders and the people who came up with the idea of pakistan -- a different direction. that is phenomenon that i tried to answer that question, how that had taken place. so that is just to begin and explain the larger context of what you're looking at. i think that iraq finds major teams of factors that i would like to mention. first and foremost, critical need for us to understand the different fields in which the afghan taliban' pakistani taliban live and how they were groomed, the genesis of these
two organizations. today, afghan taliban, all class of the old guard of the afghan taliban, seem to be quite open torq'%qrip negotiation. not towards the left but have moderated quite a bit. they're looking for opportunities and openings to negotiation. but some of the other associates, however, these in my understanding, the old guard of afghan taliban have lost control of the incidents taking place in afghanistan today, and this is a second tier leadership which has met with various sectarian groups as well. as for who really believed that the foreign presence in afghanistan were something they had to identifying. they would not necessarily taliban or militants or terrorists. that was their considered view,
and that is what they have been willing to do. that is what their tribal identity has led them to believe. that it what the historical narrative has been imbedded in their hindsightset, those people who are still fighting are one subject of afghan taliban. the pakistanis -- are trying to negotiate bringing some form or shape into the mainstream. the biggest -- is that old guard of taliban, trying to take control of the insurgent movement so they can directly and bring it towards -- that's briefly -- and what are the dynamics, and they have various other groups. one is hassan group which
operates on the border region and is now on the run. some people believe because there's a major pakistani military operation that is happening. i'll talk a bit later. i just want to explain about this division between the old guard and the new taliban. coming to the pakistani taliban. the pakistani taliban, unlike iran taliban, who had -- a few more words about the islam taliban. the cords nateed with, collaborated with al qaeda and the like but never merged. a couple of very good studies that have come out in recent years explaining there was never a merger. bin laden used afghan taliban for their purposes, for their financial needs, it used al qaeda. however, in case of pakistani taliban, they were more of a
merger that had taken place. the nature of the group and their publications, their media and the pakistani taliban are on the media, on social media as well. afghan taliban are also -- in pakistani taliban are far more dangerous and lethal in my understanding than afghan taliban. the reason is they have moved far closer to al qaeda. in fact, today if you ask -- many of the experts how do we define and analyze today, you will not be able to explain the dynamics without explaining the dynamics of the pakistani taliban. that is the kind of merger and proximity that has taken place. this brings me to the point i was referring to about iraq. the belief -- on youtube, believed that about 300
pakistani taliban and some of the militants groups, landed in iraq and from syria they moved into iraq, some of them -- in mosul in parts of iraq are in -- bag the pakistani taliban who are operating in that area. the pakistani taliban are also interestingly not -- in terms of the pashtun identity. there are sectarian groups from different major egg ethnic group who have joined the ranks of pakistani taliban in a very big fashion. the number in terms of the plat foreigns by the pakistani taliban, all you need to see is -- read about the major terrorist attack on the karachi airport, major attack on afghan
military forces, pakistani forces, destroying most important aircraft they have. being attacked on the air force base, and successfully attacked a location where pakistan is believed to have kept in of its nuclear arms. at least the delivery system. so the opinion is, pakistani taliban, their linkages are first to law enforcement, behind the scene in terms of some insiders, in terms of some people who are radical a'sed enough to private information. that is a much more dangerous phenomenon, and if i'm a security analyst, i would spend much more time in looking at the pakistani taliban than the afghan taliban. they were attempts made to engage pakistani taliban into negotiations because at least part of the even pakistani
taliban was directed because the only reason that pakistan has attempted to -- and smartly from their point of view, they moved out of the pakistani-afghanistan tribal area. into the main stream pakistan in urban centers, which it is extremely difficult to mooner to them to do any surveillance. so that is the kind of -- that's my analysis of the pakistani taliban and afghan taliban. now coming to border of -- academic, not for very long in terms of how do we understand, based on any of the hearings of any of the major issues, because brief answer to the problem can be -- whether it is a problem of law. is it about education for the rule of law?
all those are very vetted ideas from the long-term perspective, and to be able to understand that before we can attempt to tackle has to go through analysis which i claim that i have attempted and there are five point is want to mention. but before that i just mention a couple of anecdotes which happened -- these are partly my interviews for the book and partly some of the other experiences i had, and i remember the day when benazir bhutto, the former prime minister, was returning to pakistan, and i was honored to send with her for a brief timin' 1995-'96, in 2007, when he was returning, and i was talking to her in new york, and she just mentioned, you are economics but once upon a time you were a
police officer. what is your take about the security situation in assassination what should i expect when i land in pakistan? and myself, many other security officials and friends who focus on these issues, we almost had a consensus before this, and i asked her, you want me to be blunt? and direct? and she said, absolutely. and i said, i think there's a very high likelihood you will be assassinated, and she said immediately. i know. i know that part. tell me something else i need to do. still that happen. and i appreciate her courage and bravery. she knew the was walking into death. the pakistani taliban militants were strong enough because her assessment was -- and i think she was not only absolutely right at that time but that is a new reality that radicalization has taken place in pakistan is
not only confined to militants camps or the taliban areas. it's seeped into the society in some weighed. stale minority, still pakistan boy and large if you give them a char chance, relatively progressive political party, which is karachi or pashtun, the secular party, but having said that, the way that this course has changeed in pakistan, for instance, debate going on of why the isis, the militant groups who have taken over iraq, why that's a good idea. people are saying at the end of the day you have an islamic state and that's kind of discourse is relevant. the day she landed there was a major attack, those who followed that in karachi, hundreds of thousands of people coming to
see her ask there was this major attack. that evening i am very passionate about pakistan. i wrote something and -- i wrote, who tried to kill bhutto and i made the case it was the former head of the -- previous head of the pakistani tall taliban, who was killed in a drone strike. and she immediately said, i think -- she wrote that. i have kept that blackberry with my just as a memory. she sent back a text to me, and i sent that to her that night and she wrote back, how come your analysis of -- this is not -- and she wrote in her -- i quote here in detail any in book, she said something to the effect, i'm paraphrasing -- that these are the radical elements within the pakistani establishment. used the word pakistani
establish. means security forces but also -- by and large referring to establishment means intelligence and the military. she said there are radical elements from the jihad who are tired of serving are the ones who are probably behind it. later on i had the opportunity to ask the question to the pakistani former isi chief, and i think people criticize him today a lot, lesser position, people have come out but i must say i had a great experience talking to him at length. this was in 2008. when he -- this is the pakistani isi headquarters, which is one of the most lucas surous build -- luxurious buildings i have been to, i have been to president's office and the intelligence services headquarters, funded by the united states, the new building,
it's beautiful. ... asked him, general, there's something which people often say and that is kind of -- which is you ask any pakistanis in the -- not in the book -- in the tea shop, who killed benazir bhutto. they use the slang which is used in a way that refers to intelligence. this is not -- that's the impression. so i mentioned to him, i said, do you know what people in varying populations also think? i didn't want to say i have some thinking as well, so i forget the name of the tribe. do you know these people, the pakistan people party, you -- we were sitting on a very long dinner table, and by then he was very the pakistani people's party think you killed benazir bhutto.
we were sitting at a long dinner table and he was very kind and graceful. i immediately realized i should've printed differently to what he said to me, he said blame us for anything that you want. don't think that we are stupid. we knew well what would happen and we wondered the same night. in fact we did warn her. i was told mohammed ghazi went to see her, the same night the same evening. hamid karzai said -- and pakistani intelligence said the same thing. i don't want to give my impression that is my view that there may be some elements that no have limited benazir had
said. these are circles within circles if you want to understand the intelligence and pakistani government. there is almost a similar kind of hospitality in afghanistan. i had the honor to have many of them have my students at the university as well. i have seen them as very bright. maybe i should say 99%, 99% is based on my two years of interviews. even pashtuns are convinced that the problems in pakistan is because pakistan supports palestinian. they are thankful for what palestine has done for them. the point is these general perceptions are about
intelligence the role of intelligence the role of the military and what is it about politics and afghanistan. the reality is somewhere hidden behind that façade of thinking. some of that at times may be true. it requires a very delicate attempt to go into some of those meetings. i'm extremely thankful for the objective assessment. this brings me to the following things from my book. these things in fact and what helps us understand what has gone wrong and how do we understand how it has taken place in my taliban would expand in such a fashion and conduct this kind of very advanced terrorist attacks. the first thing and i will take you into the academic domain but
i promise i will be brief. what was happening in the region or those events made from outside the united states or other countries all those outside attempts as it relates internally in pakistan and afghanistan look at the issue and agree it's just isolated issue related to the pakistani iran policy. the reality is the last part of this is linked to a proxy war. pakistan india some of it intelligence you as well. you might be surprised to know that india for example the security and intelligence organization of afghanistan many senior members and very important members of that organization some of them had worked for kgb. they are generally a viewpoint about pakistanis.
they view the history of pakistan and palestine. i have seen the typical view in that organization. we know many effects that have come out and how the supporters taken place. this is the context we are talking about the regional issues. a group based in pakistan are recently they were in pakistan in the tribal area. jalalabad given some of his history there's a very good book that is come by the people who work in the haqqani group if you are interested that the haqqani group is one which is of iranian orientation which for the pakistani military intelligence was always framed as good taliban.
that is please have a security analyst immediately projected it which means there were some groups which were terrorists in their orientation. these are not political groups by the way but they never attacked pakistan despite the number of suicide bombings in pakistan and the number of attacks across pakistan. there are some groups which never went to pakistan so they are framed as good taliban. haqqani group is one of them. but they are pursuing some of the pakistani interest in afghanistan because of the expansion of the indian infrastructure in afghanistan. some right some wrongs. they don't want the situation to revert to the 1990s where they were says ethnic war in pakistan was using some of the iran media for pashtuns militants in the area. they don't want that to happen again. they wanted to risk war northern afghanistan not out of love for business but billy based on this
spurt -- perspective. the most interesting to me as i found out during my studies bats for the first many years doing the war on terror no one or maybe it was some use the word no one in most meetings between the head of state within pakistan and the united states the issue of taliban never came up. we mentioned in passing and it's a very popular issue for america to look into. why from 1002 -- 2,012,006 and the insurgents happened. they were not history. they were expanding. they were thinking and if they were in russia may be pakistan would have let it go early on. the pashtun had pakistan to
laminate which started in 2006 and 2007. in the context of the original adventures what i found out recently and i'm extremely thankful to the pakistani military office some of whom are my students and i can't talk about that part in my official domain and her minds me something important that i should've mentioned from the beginning. these are not linked or related to my job as a government job. the economy group i heard in pakistan and these are not people who are working with me, i realize the haqqani group there was no sympathy for the haqqani group in some of the military groups. in one case they pakistani general, i asked him ...
operation and he was the only one who allowed me to mention his name and explain what happened in 2009. when i asked him why you never went to the haqqani group and he said to me the sun we have lost hundreds of thousands of army officers and the question me. he said do you think i can face my soldier if i tell them that people that are killing the pakistani army in the daytime to nighttime -- he said i would not be able to face my soldiers. i trusted the general very much. he said in 2009 we had no reason whatsoever which of the groups to say though much not to say. however we didn't realize there's a difference between the military operations and the pakistan intelligence.
it was not in coordination with or cooperation with the mainstream pakistani army. that's a point which gives us some insight into this issue. the haqqani group i also feel at times they were people in pakistan who were not only sympathetic or friendly towards the haqqani group but they were scared of the haqqani group. there were many instances and this is not military. this is a paramilitary force and the generals who commanded this for so to me -- i'm fine with time? in many cases the frontier corps cap themselves remaining inside boards. they were given specific information that the haqqani operators are moving on the other side. they didn't have the weapons nor did they have the capability nor the training.
for pakistan the tribal area was also -- the first unit that landed in 2004 learned for the first time and there was a major at that time in the pakistani intelligence that told me when we landed there and realized in the province which is mainstream pakistani province you can talk to the people and they will respond to you. however the tribal areas people cannot speak in urdu and the pakistani military was seen as an outside force. they had no one who could communicate to the people in that area. for many pashtuns in the tribal area of pakistan is as much an enemy as the americans were the indians are. in one case, one of the first cases where the pakistani military arrested some of the terrorists and they were interrogating them so that time
for the muslim prayers one of the five prayers that was performed there was a call for prayers. this terrorists said to the commanding officer wears his voice coming from? are they muslim? of course they are muslim. they are in the pakistani army. due to lack of preparation also. in many cases the early attempts made by pakistan they have not given proper briefings of which are the types in the area. now two points and i will go to the second . the first one is regional tensions and pakistan as a graveyard etc. etc.. pakistan is at least a graybearded ignorance. forget about the americans on the other side of the forces.
for pakistani military intelligence it was a new world. the second reference is to the nexus between crime and terror which is difficult to understand. a new phenomenon buzzword in a sense all you need to do to be a pakistani taliban and to get as much money as you cancer kidnappings etc. is to grow a beard, of course longer than the one i have and to need to learn two or three verses. you have headgear it can be green color or white or black depending on your inclination. you can give a fatwa and claim to be a religious person and people and this is a new phenomenon in pakistan avoid challenging it. recently i traveled in a bus between two major cities in palestine and right in the middle they have this of course
video screen. they were showing an indie movie and the person sitting next to me had his own tape recorder in which there was ever recorded sermon of some religious order which is by the way very bigoted and narrow-minded. he started it and raise the voice. it was clear to see that at least 15 of us could watch the movie that was there. no one walked up to this person including myself frankly to say can you lower the voice? they knew exactly what he was doing. it was his mission for us not to watch that movie and for that matter any movie but to listen to the sermon he wanted us to hear. the difference i have seen in my lifetime and i've been in the u.s. but for the last 15 years a little bit out of touch but the pakistan that i've lived in 2000 before he came to the usa remember people would generally walk up to someone and challen
challenge. that is another change that has happened in society. many of these criminal elements now very well-known that may meet a a criminal would be a challenge but a person claiming to be a religious authority that even a religious mullah will not be challenged because they can then come out and say you are from such and such a state or you are out of islam. that's enough in a i think has taken root and which is something very important which no military -- this nexus also the major source of funding for pakistani taliban are kidnappings even in islamabad. i asked a physician or we could go what about, what are they doing in islamabad with
crime-fighting. are they getting more police? he said sir the two seniormost law enforcement in islamabad both of their cars were stolen from outside their houses. if the police chief of the cities and this one was a civilian and assistant commissioner and the other was a chief of police. it was 15 or 20 years before that it happened that they simply have no clue what had happened. so to expect pakistani civilian infrastructures capable of handling and the same is the case in afghanistan. in pakistan is one person agencies. in that guard or behind that façade also are many criminal organizations that are operating with force. this suits them in a big way.
the same in afghanistan. in my case i was told if the forces realized in one area they realized there were five girls schools. they came to know it. it was not the taliban. he was a member of the construction company. if you want a girls school everyone will say the taliban have done that. this company was the biggest company. so i'm not trying to say that the religious angle is not there for the bigger phenomena is linked to these issues in a significant fashion but i'm saying these factors crime being the most important one is also playing a big -- in karachi for example they were able to unearth a training school which is not a suicide bombing training school which is a phenomenon in the waziristan
area. in karachi this was meant to teach you how to rob a bank. the seniormost police officer who was able to enter was killed in a terrorist attack in karachi. so that is a very critical issue for us to look at. the third one is the whole issue of the frontier state. the frontier state is a hope for palestinian and afghanistan. there is no border and yes legally there is and of course imaginations also identify that but historically this was the frontier were different tribes are divided around the durand line. they operate in a different fashion to be able to control and stop it is impossible. i will leave you what to do things because after all i want to leave you with my book so you
can find out the other ideas. my book was to help my students and readers understand the layers of things that have the which are embedded there. i have made an attempt in the end to say what in my view can resolve these issues. how to set the whole thing right and other than issues of rule of law and education which are extremely important. in my view there are two particular things we have to do more than pakistan and afghanistan. one is, and this is what i've written a lot about is the investment in the civilian law enforcement infrastructure. it's neither happening in afghanistan. it's great to have printed 60,000 security forces in pakistan but how many of those are police? the police and afghanistan are really the police. it's a paramilitary force. investment employees would have
led to support at the civilian law enforcement infrastructure which is linked to rule of law and rule of muslim to democracy. you make a very clear choice. when you make an investment in training a judge in afghanistan one of my students was still there and she was brave enough to -- and i must mention her. she was the first one they told me how great is the inspiration she is getting. because many women are now opting to become judges and lawyers in afghanistan and in the last three years i think consecutively, last year for sure among the top 15 students who passed through the security system training to become a judge out of the top 15 i think they were eight or nine women.
so i'm not trying to say afghan and taliban are coming back in terms of revival. a lot has happened but that has to happen in a much more coordinated fashion. investment in civilian law enforcement infrastructure in pakistan and afghanistan. believe me it's going to be much cheaper than the other projects we have connected. and last anopheles point i think radicalization is taken root in both pakistan and afghanistan. without religious -- sectarianism has seeped into south asia and the middle east. this is more of a muslim argument. the recent sectarian them -- sectarianism has become so divisive as one factor causing militancy and extremism. in my book i will explain the tradition of the sufis and the
mistakes the strings you see from the tribal belt. i had the opportunity to go to a small place in the tribal area which was the dynamic in the tribal belt was a very different historically based on these mystics and sufis who were very inclusive and very open. i think the teachings of those great mystics in south asia can provide a bridge for the shias and sunnis and all the other groups to come together because unless you have a complete religious radicalization you will not be able to attack this phenomenon with kinetic or law enforcement. thank you very much for your patience. [applause] >> thank you very much for some. also the administration thinks you.
there was a serious temptation to stay in afghanistan. i'm going to push in that direction by asking the first question which is the risk of the connection political and military connection between afghan and pakistani government. you explained at the very beginning the differences between the two. i was in afghanistan recently. i heard a completely different story from people who say well in fact those two have no corporation whatsoever. you can move from one to the other and this is probably reality but it's not really there. so when we look at the region and they try to look at the consequences and timid look at what could be done and they look at a potential solution what can we say about this?
they say what is beyond is the whole idea of an explosion or something which is a series of localized conflict. despite the appearance of something larger but at the same time i recognize there are things that you mentioned at the end which go beyond that. can you give us your take on this linkage between taliban between the two leaders. >> to begin with indeed was the idea of the taliban which inspired the pakistanis to think about a group such as taliban. so in terms of ideas, in terms of the very phenomenon and the dynamic it was the iran taliban who came first and that's a different story the rule of the
pakistan intelligence and how much of that was indigenous which is also the case but it was primarily an afghan phenomena. later on the pakistanis were inspired and it took them quite a while. in 2001 when the whole operation after these terrorist attacks, the way the international campaign in that region began, at that time and "the new york times" are the posts or any meccas and a few try to find talabani could not find it. like masood and militants who are saying we have a -- to the myla band -- taliban. at least in an ideological lev level. the rule of taliban comes from the school of thought within the sunni sect. it has become so different that the source of the whole is still
in india. there was this empty activism movement which now in india part is a progressive but middle-of-the-road. they are very clearly against extremism and militancy that the pakistani somehow either found a home in the pashtun areas they are also inspired by the same phenomena. they were funded during the jihad so the commonality between both sides of taliban has one inspirational, secondly in terms of that subset because that is the books they read and that's the ideological framework that they have come and now they come to the third level of operation. whether there were a few instances available but i will give you one example. there was the one pakistani officer who i had the opportunity to actually go and meet the family who is an imam.
he was the senior pakistani intelligence officer who was the one who trained mullah omar. he is seen as the godfather of mullah omar trained by the way the west. he was sent because he started wearing a big turbine. he was sent a few years ago by the pakistani intelligence military to go and talk to the pakistani taliban. they have good relations with pakistan by and large they kept a good relation with the taliban, the old guard. the old guard which is it moved to pakistan. the pakistani military said today and mom we need your help. go talk to the afghan taliban and we will talk to the pakistani taliban.
the taliban had dreams that because the afghan -- the pakistani taliban got ahold of the imam and unfortunately the video of his beheading is on youtube. the pakistani taliban kept him for over a year i think, the head of him and despite the best efforts of the taliban the pakistani military never talk to one of the sons of their soil one of their legends. there was another case the son in law of pakistan's -- was kidnapped by pakistani taliban. i was told in various interviews they tried their level best to tell the iran taliban it needs to talk to the pakistani taliban. the pakistani taliban never talk to the afghan taliban. you are right in some ways there is that difference however what we have come to know recently is
when the pakistani military moved into the north area they unearthed a training center of suicide bombers run by the afghan is. on the face of it maybe there is a disconnect in terms of issues but regardless of inspiration and because the commonality and ideological framework at the end of the day it was bound to happen that they would come together. my view is if and when the u.s. forces will go completely out of afghanistan you will see a coming together of pakistan and the afghan taliban. this is a figure that the analysts and intelligence. they can have some level of friendship of the old guard of taliban. the pakistani taliban somehow will come and fight. that was wrong. they were using the same areas
similar logistics and people were jumping from one group to another so i agree sometime in the last few years afghan and pakistani taliban were disconnected but they are bound to come together more so especially when u.s. forces and when the pakistani operation will finish. the regional inspiration in the ideological framework are the same. >> please introduce yourself. sir. >> william snyder from washington d.c.. thank you for a very illuminating talk. it was very enlightening. my question is who is financing the taliban and where's the money coming from? >> for the pack is taliban -- pakistani taliban?
there are so many studies that a major chunk of money is coming from opium and you hear different members of the international forces name different people. if you asked the british you will get a different answer. the tragedy is from the american perspective they are held captive in afghanistan. it was haphazard and it was very well-meaning but all the good intentions with a lot of taxpayer money your money and my money but those were planned in an effective fashion. they were given a timeline so in the timeline so no one went after afghanistan and in strong fashion. it was small efforts here and there. the opium producers knew that the only way they could succeed in the function has to continue to get 30% and maybe a 50% cut. dividing them between the old
guard in pakistan and the insurgents in afghanistan are getting a major chunk of their money from opium. there is no doubt. secondly there are some declassified materials in the wikileaks are leaked information and i have some restriction to not talk about but what i can briefly mentioned is there is a lot of evidence most found there was a lot of funding from the gulf area to this. there are many sources where this came out. the "washington post" as well. when i probed further money is coming from some of the arab countries. they realized in fact there was a lot of money being generated in couple by the political class as a kickback sent to the gulf and then coming back in a legal fashion in the shape of
something else. a lot of that was benefiting the afghan taliban as well. the answer who funds the afghanistan taliban is different. they get most of their money and this is what the police officer said to me for kidnapping for ransom. bank robbery and in south punjab with a political economy of religious radicalization has taken a life of its own. you can go start a small mosque in any province. i think pakistan is one of few countries you need no license, no registration of any sort if you want to build a mosque or a religious center of any sort. of course it has to be islamic. the point is this political economy of radicalization gives this funding to this phenomena. when i discussed this with the pakistani military who i must add has been very open to me
when i was doing this research and i asked him the same question. you are always using a kinetic approach to cut these financial links which are linked to the criminal areas. they mentioned they have evidence that india has funded. i said i would like to take this on but where's the evidence? "the new york times" everyone says a lot about forces. we never asked them to show evidence. why is only pakistan asked to show evidence? i said i would like to know what is the nature and their argument is they found indian money and currency they are which again is not a strong argument. the point is whether right or wrong or what is the extent that's a long debate for another
day. pakistani intelligence is generally at least some of the members i met they think there are some funding from india for some of those militant groups. i would personally say i have written a little bit about intelligence organizations. i don't know if any intelligence agency in the world which is known for really doing any spiritual work. intelligentsia's responsibilities are. but in this case i met many people who are convinced senior members of government i had the option to discuss. you get the major answer or one of the answers to the question is -- and of course as stunned as i was and is much as i would have liked to have argued for us it's important to understand that there are people in pakistan educated people who are
generally convinced whether it is denial, whether it's diversion or whether it's genuine. i have no way to have that empirical evidence in front of me but there are people who are convinced that this is some american intelligentsia funding the pakistani military. the implication of this is taken very seriously. those people will blame everything on outside forces and will not do anything of which they can do to tackle this extremism and religious radicalism. it's not the majority but the reality is somewhere in between. if i had to guess i would say kidnapping for ransom and its bankrupt series -- robberies. it's religious centers unfortunately gulf and arab countries which are a major source of funding for the pakistani taliban.
>> mark schneider international crisis group. thank you very much for the discussion and i look forward to reading the book. as you know crisis group has shared your view that strengthening civilian law enforcement within pakistan as well as afghanistan is fundamental. we also have seen the work that has begun and i appreciate your assessment, through the carrier luker burman funding for civilian law enforcement in pakistan. has it been enough? as it's on the right kinds of things and you didn't take it to the next step in your call for rule of law. when will we see the five top moving fully under the regular rule of law in pakistan under the constitution so that civilian law enforcement will extend into that area and
finally one area where i have some questions. you indicated a separation between the isi and the pakistan army in terms of operations. as you know the leadership of the isi comes out of the army structure and moves back into the army usually at some point. i would say most of our own assessments would be that they are not separate entities are separate policies but in fact it's a single policy. the support for the iconic group for example comes out of that single policy. one example might be and perhaps even explain we haven't seen very much in the way of haqqani victims in the current drive and north waziristan. >> thank you very much. all the work that crisis group
is doing and your work on law enforcement reform and reform are the pakistani civil service and your thesis on pakistani moderates by producing those extensive academic solid research-based publications so thank you very much as someone who is interested in south asian studies. on the kerry -- carry luker burman bill it was one of best ideas and if i may add the last sentence in my book is that the best thing in my assessment that the united states has done for pakistan or in pakistan in the last six decades is the recent but the most extensive extension of the fulbright program. the state department and usaid deserves full credit for that. it has taken a long time for the policy shift to have taken place but it has taken place.
it will take many years for us to see because a new generation of pakistani scholars is being produced in pakistan and i have some friends from the state department sitting here who can remind me but i think it's hundreds of graduates from fulbright who have graduated or will graduate in the next couple of years. pakistan is the largest this is a product and that's a great thing. however in the case of police and law enforcement it has happened i think frankly quite late and there is not much that has been done. unlike the military relationship where organizations have separate principles and clear demarcation suffers possibilities, when it comes to police in the united states there is no single office which can coordinate any law
enforcement. inl and state department yes, at a very small level. i really hope they will be more funding from within the state department and there's a history of it. in the 60s and 70's cap the u.s. away from us and this is an idea which i want to write up my next book as 70 law enforcement partnerships has a new model for intervention not that i support international interventions but if you have to intervene in a failed state what is the first thing you'll you will do? always support the civilian infrastructure. if i'm crossing a certain limit i get a 200 or 300-dollar ticket and i'm extremely careful for the next six months.
thank you very much for those points and thank you for reminding me about that question. i should've mentioned 11 of my major findings also is an one of the ways in which we can tackle the situation is by expanding pakistan into the tribal area areas. currently is partly eponymous. no pakistani courts are pleased that area. the pakistani tribal belt and a mainstream pakistan again it will continue to go back to the hub of terrorism. on the last point on the defenses between military intelligence it's a difficult question. in terms of the orientation is easy to see the mainstream military. the top generals i think now are well coordinated and they are very well focused. this is primarily in the book
but what i found out recently is there is clarity of thinking as the guards and waziristan. when asked the pakistani general and this is mentioned about the economy group they said we will squeeze them but what i heard yesterday there was a tweak on twitter those of you who follow twitter a leading pashtun politician. i wish i could quote it exactly but he said to the effect that suicide bombing attack that happened yesterday with five people dead this is connected by those people who have been pushed out of pakistan. some of the people believe that the pakistanis pakistanis intentionally are pushing out the haqqani group southern afghanistan and there are others who think they have done it and they are recognizing that they have to push the group from the
area. unlike pakistani taliban where they are helping u.s. coordinate with drone strikes and there was one drone strike that happened yesterday is her present guest estimated but it's well directed and well coordinated. pakistan -- when it comes to the economy group they are bringing them to a new century. previously they insulted pakistan. you better go to the mullah and go into afghanistan. this time around my assessment is a common group has really pushed out. they are not killed but they are not provided -- based on my understanding it's a bit late in the game but they fully recognize this issue. it's very difficult to find out what the isi is thinking.
i will not go into that. i really honestly hope that isi is also realize this. i would like to believe that has taken place because you are right the isi reports to the army chief but in their low-level operators and there are contractors and i don't know what is the mindset they are. the military i think it's pretty clear. >> i promise to be brief and answers. i'm sorry i'm a professor and i'm trained to give long answers. >> thank you very much. i'm so grateful for such a penetrating insightful speech of many layers. you mentioned benazir bhutto's assassination. i think some of the question
remains, some of the questions continue to remain and are being debated who was behind president kennedy's killing and who killed benazir bhutto? which one of those cases will continue to remain being debated? >> you have mentioned at the end the recommendation that you ga gave. law enforcement enhancements a and -- bishop bartsch a brief doubled the forces in punjab in the same way. my question to you is based on your recommendation this pluralism and law enforcement, my question is in most of the cases in pakistan the prime
ministers became prime ministe ministers. if you become prime minister through accident and if you are asked to make a recommendation to advise the prime minister practically what is something specifically the three or four steps you will do to bring this kind of terrorism and instability to an end? thank you. >> thank you very much. you are right about benazir bhutto but the reason i would really like pakistan to thoroughly investigate and figure out who killed mr. bhutto and hukill -- because in the absence of a very clear answer it continues to become more popular and those who are behind the killings continue to think that they can kill and get away with it.
we have seen in the recent past many politicians were killed. people of the national party in that area and members of the pakistani people's party. there was a very aerial and christian leader who is a member of the parliament as a member of the cabinet also. in case of benazir bhutto we don't know who killed her. in case of -- who was killed by his own guard. they said he committed blasphemy because he supported a hindu girl. the tragedy is and i must say this there was not a single imam that day when he was killed he was ready to stand and lead the prayers for him including the official imam who should have been fired. that imam was not fire. that imam is the official imam.
so there is that fear that your point is very well taken. in the case of -- raising the salaries only one part of the problem. the main issue is your transformation as is an institution in terms of focus on france six in terms of investment in new technologies in terms of the reason why in many states there are highways and other places because you can just -- it's not meant to stop terrorism. they are not particularly focused on stopping terrorism but investigating terrorism when it happens. pakistan is not investigated that in most cases and that's a choice. pakistan is that i want and my friend from the air force pakistan don't take it personally.
whether pakistan wants f-16s or police stations. rather than afford one f-16 you can build 30 new modern police stations. it's about a policy choice and also in this regard and to most likely the best chance i will have is to be able to advise pakistan. i love my job as an academic and i would love to be a professor so there's no chance i will ever become a prime minister but if they get a chance to advise i think first and foremost i quote one of my pakistani friends who serves in a high position and i will quote him a pakistani foreign service officer he mentioned in his experience working in the prime minister's office that pakistan's all the
problems can be resolved if you get an honest and efficient and competent prime minister. because some of them are very basic. for instance first and foremost will be rooting out corruption and that can only happen if you instill a form of accountability. this cannot happen overnight but as soon as the north major case of corruption. they go after them in a strong fashion. i would be the first thing. the second thing will be what i mentioned of keeping pakistan's religious identity intact but taking pakistan towards what we call -- where it is most famous speech he has said where they go to a mosque or to a church or to a hindu temple state has nothing to do with it. this was in 1947 he he it was
not this one small intellectual thinking about his dream world. no he was the most popular that pakistan has produced. people loved him. his ideals are based on progressive pakistan. pakistan has gone very far away from those ideas. i think those are the positions of power. they can do small things for which we can take pakistan backwards in some of those issues will be related to policy issues. others will be linked to education ensuring that reviewing all the curriculum and dig out some of those words on some of the bigotry which is part and parcel. the second thing would be after accountability and education reforms in the third thing i think would be a larger issue which is a peace process with
india. i'm convinced and i think pakistani leadership is convinced you will not be able to get rid of pakistani militant groups or radicalization unless pakistan and india both come to an amicable sustainable peace process. there are signs of that. i think it's a pakistani security establishment which has to be convinced. not only the pakistani political leadership that india will have to play a role to make such a transition happened. without these three things i don't see a bright light for pakistan. >> i am president of end this and i have two short questions for you. number one is the taliban has regrouped and you make many excellent analysis of the institution.
i find it a bit paradoxical they have taken large territories with their posture is significantly different than what it was in 2001 and secondly the elections were well-conducted and well attended and there was no disruption or activities from taliban. so i find it a little hard to believe. my second question is the military action in progress. do you think it's going to continue for long and what will be the long-term outcome of that? do you see the possibility of isolating pakistan and taliban from the other taliban's? >> thank you very much. you are absolutely right in the case of afghan taliban or
afghanistan's political situation we have a crisis there but the crisis is different. i think that tells us a lot about the resilience and also about some of the very good things that have happened benefiting from the u.s. effort and there are major mistakes as well like supporting warlords and so many others on the part of united states frankly. at the same time there's a new middle class that's going up in afghanistan and that is a new stake in afghanistan's future. i think they owe it to the international community in the united states which funded it by and large. however in the case of 13,000 polling stations there were less than 700 or 800